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This paper uses a sample of 335 firms participating in strategic alliances in order to re-examine the 
value creation through strategic alliances. We  show  that  the immediate positive response of  stock 
markets  to  new  strategic  alliances  is  followed  by  negative  abnormal  returns.  Twenty  days  after 
announcements, cumulative positive abnormal return is only evident for the firms with the highest 
stock market’s response to the announcement. We relate the positive abnormal returns reported in 
previous  research  to  the  presence  of  short-run  over-reaction  in  stock  markets  and  conclude  in  the 
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1. Introduction 
Compared to other types of cooperation between firms, strategic alliances seem to be 
less demanding. Alliances are often created without any exchange of shares or capital 
investment.    Firms  agree  to  share  knowledge,  or  to  cooperate  in  development, 
production or marketing of products with a low level of commitment. The lack of 
commitment  may  reduce  different  type  of  risk.  Firms  suspecting  that  cooperation 
might not be successful, can use this type of cooperation in order to test the potential 
of the cooperation without risking control over their unique knowledge, product or 
market stance.  If the firms involved in the alliance are themselves skeptical, why 
shouldn’t  the  investors  be  skeptical  too?  If  strategic  alliances  create  value,  why 
wouldn’t firms engage in artificial alliances simply in order to deceive the market and 
elevate their value? 
Many studies have tried to test value creation through strategic alliances that do not 
involve exchange of shares or capital investment. Chan et al. (1997) used event study 
methodology to examine stock price responses to non-equity alliance announcements. 
Their sample  consisted  of 345 strategic alliances announced between 1983 -1992. 
They  found,  on  average,  a  significant  positive  abnormal  return  (0.64%)  on  the 
announcement day. McConnell and Nantell (1985); Koh and Venkataraman,(1991); 
Woolridge  and  Snow  (1990);  Robinson  and  Stuart  (2000);  Johnson  and  Houston 
(2000);  Neill  et  al.  (2001)  and  Socher  (2004)  have  discovered  similar  results. 
However the cumulative abnormal return in these studies was calculated up to five to 
six  days  after  the  announcement,  and  no  test  was  carried  out  to  examine  the 
persistence of the created value beyond the announcement period.  
Over-reaction and under-reaction of stock markets is prevalent. DeBondt and Thaler 
(1985) were among the first to document long-term (three to five years) reversal in 
stock returns; winner firms tend to be future losers, and vice versa. They attributed 
this phenomenon of over-reaction to the behavioral decision theory of Kahneman and 
Tversky (1982). The poor post-event returns of initial public offerings documented by 
Ritter  (1991),  and  later  on  by  others,  can  also  be  treated  as  an  over-reaction 
phenomenon.  
On the other hand, it seems that markets also tend to under-react. Ball and Brown 
(1968) were the first to show that stock prices respond to earnings about a year after 
they are announced. Short-term momentum in stock returns was first identified by 3  
 
Jagadeesh and Titman (1993) that showed winners are to be future short-term winners 
and  losers  to  be  short-term  losers.  This  phenomenon  can  also  be  classified  as  a 
symptom of under-reaction.  
These  phenomena  of  over-reaction  and  under-reaction  can  blur  the  real  value  of 
events in the context of event-study methodology. In this study we carry out an event-
study similar to those of previous studies (such as Chan et al. (1997) and Woolridge 
and Snow (1990)) and simply refine it by prolonging the post-event window to 20 
days after the announcement day. Hence, we are able to control for possible short-
term anomalies (over-reaction and under-reaction). 
The  sample  used  is  of  335  firms  (including  66  duplicates)  traded  in  the  US  and 
participating in 289 strategic alliances throughout the years 1990-1997. As in previous 
studies, a market model is used for measuring abnormal returns. Characteristics of 
firms are collected from public announcements and the COMPUTAT database. Daily 
returns are taken from CRSP.  
The estimation reveals that, as in previous studies, participating firms exhibit positive 
and statistically significant abnormal returns during the 3-day period surrounding the 
announcement  day.  The  abnormal  returns  are  also  higher  for  alliances  involving 
capital investments. Focusing on alliances that do not involve capital investments, we 
report  several  interesting  results.  Over-reaction  dominates  the  short-run  results. 
Positive  abnormal  returns  are  followed  by  statistically  significant  and  negative 
abnormal return on a scale such that the cumulative abnormal return up to 20 days 
after  the  announcement  is  non-positive  and  statistically  insignificant.  Focusing  on 
firms without negative pre-event abnormal returns reveals that the observed reversal 
in returns is not due to momentum effect. 
Though  on  average  strategic  alliances  do  not  create  value,  one  cannot  reject  the 
possibility that some alliances do. The positive abnormal return of firms with the 
highest positive immediate response persists at least 20 days after the announcement 
day.  We  relate  this  finding  to  the  market’s  ability  to  identify  the  more  valuable 
alliances. 
Several  tests  are  carried  out  in  order  to  identify  the  characteristics  of  firms  and 
alliances with positive abnormal returns. Out of these characteristics, high-tech firms, 
small firms and firms in alliances aiming at the current markets of the participants, 
exhibit  higher  positive  abnormal  returns  during  the  event  window.  While  this  is 
theoretically expected and was also observed in previous studies, we also show that 4  
 
these positive abnormal returns might also be a product of over-reaction. We conclude 
that additional characteristics are used by market players in assessing the value added 
of strategic alliances. 
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  following.  Section  2  summarizes  related 
literature and presents the research hypotheses. A description of the database and the 
methodology is presented in section 3. Section 4 presents the results and section 5 
concludes. 
2. Related Literature and Research Hypotheses 
Earlier studies acknowledge a positive and significant average return surrounding the 
announcement date of the alliance. Chan et al. (1997) and Neill et al. (2001) used 
event  study  methodology  to  examine  stock  price  responses  to  non-equity  alliance 
announcements.  The  sample  of  Chan  et  al.  (1997)  consisted  of  345  non-equity 
alliances announced in the USA from 1983 to 1992. The sample of Neill et al. (2001) 
consisted of 89 non-equity alliances announced in the USA from 1987 to 1994. They 
both  discovered  a  significant  positive  stock  price  response.  Similar  results  were 
discovered  by  McConnell  and  Nantell,  1985;  Koh  and  Venkataraman,  1991; 
Woolridge and Snow, 1990; Robinson and Stuart, 2000; Johnson and Houston, 2000; 
Socher, 2004).   
Some of the earlier studies attempted to find common factors among the firms which 
may explain the positive stock market reaction. The possible reasons relate either to a 
characteristic of the firms involved in the alliance or to a characteristic of the alliance 
itself.  
The type of the alliance is an example of such an alliance characteristic. Promotional 
alliances are one type of alliance. Such an alliance is basically an advertising and 
promotion  contract  combined  with  a  long-run  relationship.  The  main  benefit  of  a 
promotional alliance is that it increases consumer awareness about the firm’s products 
and services.  
A technological alliance is another type of alliance and it appeared to be of a greater 
value.  Liu  (2004)  examined  the  stock  market  reactions  to  U.S  biotech  innovation 
news announcements from 1983 to 1993. He found positive abnormal returns during 
the announcement period. He also found post-announcement abnormal returns that 
were positively related to a firm’s technology depth. Das et al (1998) examined 119 5  
 
strategic alliances formed from 1987 to 1991. They found that the capital markets 
appear to be indifferent to announcements of strategic alliances. Nevertheless, having 
divided their sample by alliance type, they found that technological alliances enjoyed 
greater abnormal returns than marketing alliances. These findings were supported by 
Hagedoorn and Schakenraad (1994) and by Chan et al. (1997). 
Another  interesting  finding  is  that  the  smaller  partners  in  technological  alliances 
appeared  to  benefit  the  most.  Chung  et  al  (2006)  supported  those  findings.  They 
proposed a framework to study the efficiency of alliances between small firms in the 
knowledge  industry.  They  claimed  that  the  benefits  from  forming  an  alliance  are 
pronounced for small firms, as they specialize in a certain niche, which tends to be in 
demand regardless of the size of the partnering firms. Hoffman and Schlosser (2001) 
and Bar-Nir and Smith (2002) claimed that small firms creating alliances are provided 
with  access  to  external  resources  and  market  opportunities.  For  large  firms,  the 
alliance with small firms provides the specialized expertise necessary to round off 
their capabilities and experience.      
Parkhe (1993) dealt with national and multinational alliances. He compared alliances 
among US firms only to alliances involving a single US and a single non-US firm. He 
found fundamental differences between the two groups. His findings are explained by 
Kluckhohn and Kroeberg (1952), Beamish (1985), Geringer and Hebert (1991) and 
Harrigan (1985), claiming that multinational alliances bring together people who may 
have different patterns of behaving and believing. An example can be found in the 
partners'  approaches  to  conflict  resolution.  In  some  cultures  (e.g.,  Europe,  US), 
conflict is viewed as a healthy and an inevitable part of relationships, while in other 
cultures (e.g., Japan, South Korea, the Middle East), conflict and open confrontation 
are deemed distasteful. Parkhe (1993) found that such fundamental differences create 
significant differences in the structuring and ongoing management of alliances. Such 
differences are not costless; hence, such international alliances are expected to be 
more  volatile  and  less  successful.  The  findings  of  Garrette  and  Dussauge  (1995) 
support  that  assumption.  They  examined  63  international  aerospace  and  defense 
industry alliances over the period 1950-1990. They found that the industry tends not 
to concentrate on an international level because of political constraints. Instead, they 
found  that  over  the  years,  the  industry  has  increasingly  been  moving  towards 
establishing  semi-structured  organizations  to  manage  multinational  joint  projects. 6  
 
Thus, firms manage to gain a size advantage in global markets while maintaining 
autonomous decision-making centers at the country level. 
Another interesting finding of Garrette and Dussauge (1995) deals with the goal of the 
alliance. Hennart (1988) and Kogut (1988) defined complementary (or link) alliances 
as those aiming to globalize a product in a multi-domestic setting by benefiting from 
the complementarities that exist between the partner firms. For instance, one partner 
promotes the other partner's products in a domestic market. Scale alliances are set up 
to deal with the increasing globalization of markets and customers. Therefore, they 
mutually develop, manufacture and market common products. The partners choose to 
unite in order to pool resources rather than to profit from any complementarities. 
Another  crucial  issue  deals  with  the  stability  and  length  of  alliances.  Williamson 
(1985) considered strategic alliances as "unstable, with a tendency to evolve into more 
stable  organizational  forms".  Franko  (1971)  and  (Kogut)  1988  claimed  that  many 
alliances  characterized  by  a  high  degree  of  flexibility,  a  low  level  of  irreversible 
commitment,  and  incomplete  contracts  are  unsuitable  for  carrying  out  long-term 
projects. Therefore we would expect long-term alliances to be less stable, and hence 
less profitable and more likely to fail.  
Das  and  Teng  (1998;2000)  reinforce  this  assumption.  They  offer  a  qualitative 
approach presenting the obstacles which may lead to termination of alliances. Though 
alliances depend on a great number of factors, the tension in short-term versus long-
term orientation is a critical one. A long-term orientation provides the commitment 
needed  for  a  good  working  relationship,  whereas  a  short-term  orientation  stresses 
prompt results. They claim that in order to maintain an alliance, its partners need to be 
able  to  constantly  maintain  both  long  and  short  term  orientations.  Hamel  (1991) 
claimed that asymmetry between the firms increases the probability of termination of 
the  alliance.  Therefore,  we  would  expect  long  term  alliances  to  have  a  greater 
probability  of  termination,  since  they  need  to  maintain  both  long  and  short  term 
orientations over time. 
The following table summarizes the main empirical studies of the literature review. 
Some  studies  examine  stock  market  reaction  to  the  alliance  by  using  event  study 
methodology; others examine the success of alliances by various measures: firm size, 7  
 
longevity etc.  However, none of these studies examines the cumulative abnormal 
return beyond six days after the announcement. 8  
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  1  BarNir A., Smith K.A.  Prior to 2002
4  149 
Small & mid-size 
manufacturing firms in the 
North East US 
-  -  Not examined  Industry type 
  6 
Chan S.H., Kensinger J.W., Keown 
A.J., Martin J.D.  1983-1992  345 
At least one partner's 
common stock was publicly 
traded 
+  [-20, +5]  Non capital 
alliances 
Industry type, cooperative 
agreements, technology 
  10  Das S, Sen K.P., Sengupta S.  1987-1991  119  Two-party alliances  +  [-5,+5]  Not examined  Technology, firm’s 
profitability, size 
  15  Dussauge P., Garrette B.  1950-1990  63  International
5 aerospace and 
defense industry firms  -  -  Not examined  Cooperative agreements, 
technical quality 
  19  Hagedoorn J., Schakenraad J.  1980-1988  346  European, American, and 
Japanese firms  -  -  Not examined  Industry type, country of 
origin, size 
  20  Hamel G.  Prior to 2001
6  9  International alliances  -  -  Not examined  Symmetry of characteristics 
of partner firms 
  24  Hoffmann W.H., Schlosser R.  Prior to 2001
7  164  Small & mid size Austrian 
firms  -  -  Not examined  Trust, strategic compatibility, 
governance mechanisms 
  26  Johnson S.A, Houston M.B.  1991-1995  226  All partner's common stock 
was publicly traded  +  [-1,0]  Not examined  Horizontal/vertical alliances 
  32  Koh J., Venkataraman N.  1972-1986  239  Information technology  +  [-2,+1]  Not examined  Cooperative agreements, size, 
resource similarity 
                                                  
2 Serial number of the paper as presented in the bibliography section.  
3 Range of days relative to announcement date, for which abnormal market return was examined (relevant only for papers conducting event study).
 
4 Empirical data was collected in order to examine if the tendency to ally is determined by company characteristics. Stock market reaction was not examined. 
 
5 Partner firms originating from different countries 
6 Empirical data was collected in order to examine the stability and longevity of alliances. Stock market reaction was not examined.
 
7 Empirical data was collected in order to examine the weights of various success factors in alliance-making in small and mid-size enterprises. Stock market reaction was not 
examined. 



















  33  Liu Q.  1983-1993  118  U.S. Biotech firms  +  [-1,1]  Not examined   
  34  McConnell J.J., and Nantell T.J.  1972-1979  210  U.S. domestic joint ventures  +  [-1,0]  Not examined  Technology 
  35 
Neill J., Pfeiffer G.M., Young-Ybarra 
C.E.  1987-1994  89 
Information 
technology research and 
development (ITR&D) 
+  [-5,+6]  Not examined  25 
  36  Parkhe A.  1983-1988  342 
Limited industries
10, two-
party alliances, at least one 
US firm 
-  -  Not examined  Size, alliance type 
  39  Socher  1997-2002  1,037  German firms  +  [-2,0]  Not examined  Country of origin, structure 





                                                  
8 Serial number of the paper as presented in bibliography section.  
9 Range of days relative to announcement date, for which abnormal market return was examined (relevant only for papers conducting event study).
 
10 Chemicals and allied products, machinery (except electric), electrical and electronic equipment and transport equipment. 
11  Woolridge and Snow (1990) defined capital investment as one of the categories included in the definition of "alliance type" 10  
 
3. Data & Methodology 
3.1 Data 
In this study, several hypothesizes are under investigation. Some deal with stock market 
reaction to strategic alliances, others explore the characteristics of the selected strategic 
alliances that create value during the event window. Hence, unique data sufficient to test 
both types of hypothesis was collected. Data collection was conducted in two phases.  
In Phase I, an original database consisting of relevant category variables was constructed. 
The  database  describes  373  strategic  alliances  conducted  by  493  firms,  collected 
systematically  following  selection  criteria.  To  obtain  our  sample  of  firms  entering 
strategic alliance, we searched the Lexis/Nexis database (including Business Wire, PR 
Newswire, Southwest Newswire, Reuters, and United Press International). To perform 
the search, we retrieved announcements containing the key words 'strategic alliance' in 
the title of the announcement. The announcements collected were those identified by the 
search and published between Jan. 1
st 1990 and Dec. 31
st 1997. Our search identified 373 
alliances made by 493 firms in which at least one partner's common stock was publicly 
traded in any stock exchange in the world.   
It is possible to draw several variables from the announcements due to their standardized 
structure. The variables drawn are characteristics either of the alliance itself (alliance 
date,  alliance  goal,  etc.)  or  of  the  firms  initiating  the  alliance  (industry,  high/low 
technology, etc.).  The variables are used for conducting the tests presented later in this 
paper.  
In Phase II, numeric data regarding the stock market performance of the firms is added to 
the database. The data source for stock market performance is the Center for Research on 
Security Prices daily returns (CRSP) files. Firms having insufficient
12 record history on 
the CRSP files were omitted from the database. The remaining and final database consists 
of 289 alliances held by 294 firms. 66 firms appear more than once in our database, hence 
the total number of firms participating in alliances is 355 (including duplicates). 
The main category data collected in Phase I is presented in Tables 1-8. Table 1 shows the 
annual distribution of the strategic alliances within the sample and the firms participating 11  
 
in them. Of the 289 sample alliances, 33% were created in 1997 and 25% in 1996.  In 
these alliances, 355 involved firms which had return data available in the CRSP database. 
Since some firms have more than a single appearance in the database, the total sample 
consists of 298 firms only. The study considers duplicates as separate observations. 
To distinguish alliances from other types of mutual agreements, it is customary to focus 
on  alliances  with  no  capital  investment.  Table  2  shows  the  distribution  of  firms’ 
observations  by  alliance  year  and  by  involvement  of  capital  investment.  Capital 
investment is identified if the alliance announcement indicates cash investment, purchase 
of shares or exchange of shares. Only 293 observations are of alliances without capital 
investment, of which 103 are from 1997.  
Since the statistical analysis is carried out on observations of alliances with no capital 
investment,  the  rest  of  the  descriptive  tables  (Tables  3-8)  presnt  the  characteristic 
distribution  of  observations  for  both  alliance  groups  (with  and  without  capital 
investment).  Table  3  reveals  that  the  most  frequent  type  of  alliance  is  of  mutual 
manufacture (162 firms of 293 firms). Development alliances consist of 40 firms and 
marketing alliances of 46 firms
13 
Table 4 indicates that the majority of observations in alliances without capital investment 
is of low-tech firms (213 out of 293 firms). The proportion of high-tech firms is higher in 
alliances with capital investment (24 out of 62 firms – 38.7%) than in the other alliances 
(80 out of 293 firms – 27.3%). The large number of high-tech firms enables a separate 
analysis of this group in order to compare the results to those of previous studies with a 
higher proportion of high-tech firms (e.g. Chan et al. ,1997)  
Table 5 reveals that most of the firms participating in non capital alliances originate in 
the US (235 out of 293). 33 of the remaining firms are involved in multinational alliances 
and the rest (25 firms) may not be classified according to this principle. Table 6 indicates 
that both groups of marketing alliances, ‘Market entry’ and ‘Existing market’, are large 
enough  to  be  the  subject  of  separate  analysis  (98  firms  and  169  firms  respectively). 
                                                                                                                                                  
12 Our event study includes data from the 170 days prior to announcement date and the 20 days afterwards. 
We excluded from our database firms that did no have stock market data for this period. 
13  Development alliances include ‘Development’, ‘Development + manufacture’, ‘Development + 
marketing’ and ‘Mutual development’. Marketing alliances include ‘Marketing’, ‘Development + 
marketing’ and ‘Sales & marketing’ 12  
 
‘Market entry’ alliances are those aiming to enter a new market and ‘Existing market’ 
alliances are those aiming to enhance production or sale within partners’ markets.  
The classification of the firms in alliances without capital investment according to the 
longevity of the alliance (Table 7) reveals that most (213 out of 293 firms) chose to enter 
short-term alliances. However, almost half the firms in alliances with capital investment 
chose  to  enter  into  a  long-term  alliance.  Short  term  alliance  is  indicated  for 
announcements clarifying that the alliance is for a single product or project. Long term 
alliance is indicated for more than a single product or project or for firms signing long 
term agreements. 
Table 8 shows that majority of the sample firms are involved in alliances over a new 
product versus an existing product. This is true for alliances without capital investment 
(182 out of 293 firms deal with new products) while in alliances with capital investment 
the majority of the firms (34 out of 62) enter an alliance over an existing product.  
These tables suggest that the alliances with capital investment have features signaling a 
higher prospect of success – high-tech firms in long-term alliances aiming to penetrate 
their current products into new markets. 
  
3.2 Methodology 
We conducted an event study to measure the stock markets’ abnormal returns around the 
announcement  of  strategic  alliances.  The  methods  are  similar  to  those  described  in 
Campbell, Lo and Mackinlay (1997). Defining the announcement day as day zero, the 
market model is estimated for each firm using daily stock returns and S&P 500 returns 
during the estimation period of days [-170, -21]. The alphas and betas are used in order to 
measure the abnormal returns in several time windows: [-20,-5], [-4, -2], [-1, 1], [2, 4], 
[5, 20], [-1, 20]. The window [-1, 1] is defined to be the event window or announcement 
window. Standard deviation of the abnormal returns is used to apply cross-sectional t 
tests for the mean of the abnormal returns during each time window. Additional non-
parametric tests of Wilcoxon sign test (binomial test) and Wilcoxon sign rank tests are 
also used to test whether the median of the abnormal returns is zero. 
 13  
 
4. Results 
In this section we report the results for the stock market response to announcements on 
strategic  alliances.  Overall,  we  find  that  stock  markets  react  positively  to  market 
announcements during the announcement window but that stock prices fall to the level 
prior to the announcement within 20 days of the announcement.  Table 9 presents the 
results of the event study for the entire sample. Panel A reports that the abnormal return 
(AR) for the entire sample during the announcement window (days [-1, 1]) is positive and 
statistically  significant.  56.34%  of  the  stocks in  the  sample  respond  positively  to the 
announcement. While the average abnormal return during the event window is 1.69%, the 
median is only 0.45%. However sign-test and rank-sum-test counter the null hypothesis 
that the median of the abnormal return is zero. To test whether strategic alliances have a 
positive response even in the case that they do not involve any capital investment, the 
statistical tests are re-conducted on two sub-samples. Panel B shows the results for 293 
firms participating in strategic alliances that do not involve any capital investment and 
Panel C the results for the other 62 firms. The response during the announcement window 
is positive and statistically significant for both sub-samples. However, the average and 
median abnormal returns are higher for the cases of capital investment (3.00% and 1.14% 
respectively, compared to 1.41% and 0.37% ). The difference in response is also reflected 
in the proportion of the firms that respond positively to the announcement, 62.90% vs. 
54.95% only.   
These results are in line with those of Chan et al. (1997), Das et al. (1998), Koh and 
Venkataraman (1991), Woolridge and Snow (1990), Johnson and Houston (2000), Neil et 
al.  (2001)  who  report  positive  AR  around  the  announcement  day,  leading  to  the 
conclusion that strategic alliances create value even when there are no capital investments 
involved. However, calculating the AR for the [5, 20] window refute this conclusion. 
Focusing on the alliances that do not involve capital investment (as in previous studies), 
the abnormal returns in this window are shown to be significantly negative (mean of -
1.85% and median of -1.13%). The cumulative abnormal return for the window [-1, 20] is 
also  negative  but  statistically  insignificant  (mean  of  -0.55%  and  median  of  -1.13%). 
48.12% only of the firm have positive abnormal returns during the [-1, 20] window. 14  
 
The sub-sample of the alliances that involve capital investments (Panel C) show mixed 
results. The average abnormal return during the [5, 20] window is negative (-0.84% ) but 
the  median  is  positive  (0.84%).  The  cumulative  abnormal  return  during  the  [-1,  20] 
window is positive in average (2.51%) but has a negative median (-0.47%). None of the 
figures (means and medians) for the periods [5, 20] and [-1, 20] is statistically significant. 
These  results  suggest  that  immediately  after  the  announcement,  the  market  attaches 
positive value to the strategic alliance, even in the case that it does not involve any capital 
investment. However, in a short period of 20 days after the announcement, the market 
reverses its response. This is a typical overreaction as documented by De Bondt and 
Thaler  (1985)  and  Mitchel  et  al.  (2004).  Analyzing  the  cumulative  abnormal  returns 
within  20  days  from  the  announcement,  one  cannot  conclude  that  strategic  alliances 
create value to their participants. 
From  now  on,  the  analysis  deals  with  strategic  alliances  that  leave  out  any  capital 
investment. The next stage would be to exclude the possibility that the results reflect a 
negative momentum in the returns of the participants’ stocks. Table 9 shows that the 
abnormal returns during the time-windows [-20, -5] and [-4, -2] are negative as well. It 
can be argued that strategic alliances arise during periods of negative momentum. The 
question of negative momentum as a trigger for alliances is not within the scope of this 
paper. However, it is necessary to exclude the possibility that negative abnormal returns 
during the [5, 20] window reflect the continuation of this negative momentum.  
It should be noted that while the negative abnormal returns during the [5, 20] window are 
statistically  significant,  the  abnormal  returns  during  the  [-20,  -5]  window  are  not. 
Nevertheless, a  special  analysis  is  carried  out to  address  the  question  of  momentum. 
Table 10 shows the results of an event study carried out on four sub-samples. The 293 
firms are sorted according to their abnormal returns during the [-20, -5] window. Quarter 
1 consists of the firms with the lowest abnormal returns during [-20, 5] and Quarter 4 
with  the  highest.  Panels  A  to  D  show  the  results  for  Quarters  1  to  4  respectively. 
Momentum seems indeed to explain some of the results. It is evident that the AR during 
the [5, 20] window corresponds to the AR during [-20, -5]. The higher the AR during [-
20, -5], the higher is the AR during [5, 20].   15  
 
However, results for Quarter 3 are of special interest. While the mean and the median of 
the AR for this group during [-20, -5] are positive, the mean and the median of the AR 
during [5, 20] are negative. And while 87.67% of the firms had positive AR during [-20, -
5], 56.16% had negative AR during [5, 20]. Despite the statistically significant positive 
AR during the event window [-1, 1], the cumulative AR during the [-1, 20] has negative 
mean and median and is statistically insignificant. Furthermore, the only quarter with 
positive AR during [5, 20] is Quarter 4, with AR during [-20, -5] that averages to 18.77% 
compared to 1.53% only during [5, 20]. We conclude that the reversal in market returns 
following the announcements is beyond a possible momentum effect. 
The reversal in market returns can be interpreted as a response to over-reaction during the 
event window. It is reasonable that in the few weeks following the announcement the 
market re-examines the value created by the strategic alliance. If the market attributed 
zero value to all strategic alliances, there would be no sense in the positive immediate 
response of the market to the announcement. Therefore we should expect positive value 
in strategic alliances at least in some firms. To test this hypothesis, the sample is sorted 
according to the AR during the event window [-1, 1]. Then the sample is grouped into 
four quarters, where Quarter 1 consists of the firms with the lowest AR during the event 
window [-1,1] and Quarter 4 those with the highest. The results for the event study are 
presented in Table 11.  Quarters 3 and 4 are of special interest. These firms had positive 
AR during the event window. They also experienced reversal in returns during the [5, 20] 
window,  but  the  cumulative  AR  during  [-1,  20]  remains  positive  and  in  the  case  of 
Quarter  4  even  statistically  significant.  It  can  be  concluded  that  the  response  of  the 
market to  strategic  alliances is selective.  Strategic  alliances  with  strong  stock market 
response during the announcement window are perceived as value creators even 20 days 
after the announcement.  
The next stage in the analysis aims to explore the characteristics of the selected strategic 
alliances  that  do  create  value  during  [-1,  20].  Table  12  shows  the  results  of  the  re-
examination of higher value creation in the high-tech industry as documented by Das et 
al. (1998). The sample is divided into two sub-samples. Panel A contains the results for 
the high-tech companies and Panel B the results for the rest. The two groups respond 
following the same pattern as the entire sample. However, while the results for the low-16  
 
tech companies are statistically insignificant, the results for the high-tech companies are 
stronger (in absolute terms) and statistically significant both during the event window [-1, 
1] and the reversal window [5, 20]. The AR during [-1, 20] is negative and statistically 
insignificant for the high-tech companies, as for the entire sample. Value creation appears 
to be absent among high-tech firms. 
The re-examination of the size effect is shown in Table 13. For this purpose, the sample 
is divided into two sub-samples based on the value of the total assets (retrieved from 
COMPUSTAT). Panel A shows the results for firms that are larger than the median in the 
sample (128.98$ million) and Panel B for the smaller firms. It is evident that the smaller 
firms’ response is stronger in absolute terms both during the announcement window (as 
in Chung et al., 2006) and the response window. However, once again the cumulative AR 
during  [-1,  20]  is  negative  and  statistically  insignificant.  The  larger  firms’  response 
during [-1, 20] is positive but again statistically insignificant. 
To  address  the  relevance  of  the  geographic  location  of  the  alliance  parties  (as 
documented by Parkhe, 1993), the sample is grouped again according to the location of 
all parties in the alliance (Table 14). Alliances all of whose parties are incorporated in the 
US are called ‘National’ and those with at least one company located outside the US are 
called ‘Multinational’. The  results  concerning  this  issue  are  mixed. While  the  AR  of 
multinational alliances during the event window is higher, it is statistically insignificant. 
The  national  alliances behave  as  the  entire sample.  A  larger sample  of  multinational 
alliances would probably produce clearer results. 
Alliances dealing with a current product are expected to have a higher probability of 
succeeding  compared to  alliances dealing with  new  products.  Table  15  compares the 
results of the event study for the two sub-samples, one for firms tied in alliances for 
current markets and the other for firms in alliances aiming at a new market. It appears 
that  alliances  dealing  with  current  markets  indeed  have  a  higher  and  statistically 
significant market response. The reversal in returns of new-market alliances appears to be 
strong  and  statistically  insignificant.  Yet  the  cumulative  AR  of  the  ‘current  market’ 
alliances  does  not  appear  to  be  statistically  significant  within  20  days  after  the 
announcement. 17  
 
The issue of the stability of the alliances is tested and reported in Table 16. As expected, 
short-tem  alliances  have  a  positive  statistically  significant  response  during  the 
announcement window [-1,1] especially compared to the long-term alliances. Once again, 
the statistically significant market reversal during [5, 20] eliminates this AR and short-
term alliances do not appear to be more valuable. 
To conclude, none of the characteristics documented in the literature predicting higher-
value  creation  by  strategic  alliances  appears  to  be  economically  and  statistically 
significant when observing abnormal returns within 20 days after announcement days. 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
The current empirical literature testing value creation through strategic alliances, uses 
short-run  event  study  methodology,  and  concludes  with  significant  value  creation  by 
strategic alliances. Using a sample of 335 firms participating in 289 alliances over the 
years 1990-1997, we show that the positive value related to strategic alliances is due to 
over-reaction. We show that 20 days after announcing the alliance positive cumulative 
abnormal returns are only present in alliances that draw the highest market response at 
the  announcement  time  interval.  We  also  show  that  stocks  of  firms  with  several 
characteristics (such as high-tech, small size and participants in alliances focusing on 
current markets) exhibit a higher positive response to new alliances. However none of the 
tested characteristics is able to predict a positive abnormal return beyond the 20 days. 
We conclude that the positive value of strategic alliances evident in previous research 
may simply be a product of mis-measurement of abnormal returns in the presence of 
short-run stock market anomalies. The only signal predicting persistent market response 
beyond the 20 days is the market’s response itself at the time of announcement. Hence, 
we conclude that the stock market does identify the more valuable alliances. However, 
only long-run analysis of real achievements of strategic alliances, rather than observation 
of stock market response, may produce conclusive results in the evaluation of strategic 
alliances.  18  
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Annual distribution of strategic alliance announcements 
 
This table shows the annual distribution of strategic alliance announcements and the number of 
firms involved in them throughout the period 1990-1997. Announcements were identified 
searching the Lexis/Nexis database using the key words “strategic alliance”. Announcements in 
which neither firm has return data on CRSP available were omitted.  
 
No. of firms
14  Percent of total  No. of announcements  Year of announcement 
5  2%  5  1990 
16  4%  12  1991 
27  8%  23  1992 
36  10%  29  1993 
47  13%  38  1994 
16  4%  13  1995 
92  25%  73  1996 
116  33%  96  1997 




Firms' distribution by capital investment and by year  
 
This table shows the annual distribution of firms in the sample by whether, according to the 
announcement,  a  type  of  capital  investment  (purchase  of  shares  or  direct  investment)  was 




investment                 
 
  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  Total 
No  4  13  23  27  35  14  74  103  293 
Yes  1  3  4  9  12  2  18  13  62 
Total  5  16  27  36  47  16  92  116  355 
 
                                                  
14 Including duplicates (there are records of 355 firms, consisting of 289 firms, some of which appear more 
than once in the database)    23  
 
Table 3 
Firms' distribution by capital investment and by alliance type  
 
This table shows the distribution of firms in the sample by alliance type and whether the alliance 
involved any type of capital investment (purchase of share or direct investment), as inferred from 
the announcement. 
 
Total  No  Yes Alliance product /Capital 
investment 
31  24  7  Unknown
15 
2    2  Consulting 
32  27  5  Development 
17  7  10 Development + manufacture 
5  5    Development + marketing 
15  14  1  Distribution 
13  4  9  Equity investment 
5  4  1  Knowledge 
3  3    Maintenance 
30  23  7  Marketing 
1  1    Mutual developments 
177  162  15 Mutual manufacture 
1  1    Operational 
23  18  5  Sales & marketing 
355  293  62 Total 
 
   
Table 4 
 
Firms' distribution by capital investment and by technology (high/low)  
 
This table shows the distribution of firms in the sample by level of technology and whether the 
alliance involved any type of capital investment. SIC is used for industrial classification and high-
tech versus low-tech classifications are based on Business Week’s classification scheme. 
 
Capital investment/Firm’s 
technology  High-tech  Low-tech  Total 
No  80  213  293 
Yes  24  38  62 
Total  104  251  355 
 
                                                  




Firms' distribution by capital investment and by alliance deployment 
(national/multinational) 
 
This table shows the distribution of multinational / national firms in the sample according to 
whether the alliance involved any type of capital investment. A multinational alliance is one in 




investment/deployment  National  Multinational  Unknown
16  Total 
No  235  33  25  293 
Yes  37  18  7  62 




Firms' distribution by capital investment and by marketing goal (existing market/ market 
entry) 
 
This table shows the distribution of firms in the sample by the marketing goal of the alliance 
according to whether the alliance involved any type of capital investment. Marketing goals are 









17  Total 
No  98  169  26  293 
Yes  26  29  7  62 
Total  124  198  33  355 
 
                                                  
16 Not mentioned in the announcement and/or cannot be inferred from it. 
17 Not mentioned in the announcement and/or cannot be inferred from it. 25  
 
Table 7 
Firms' distribution by capital investment and by longevity of the alliance (short term/ long 
term) 
This table shows the distribution of firms in the sample by the longevity goal of the alliance 
according to whether the alliance involved any type of capital investment. A short term alliance is 
indicated for announcements which make clear that the alliance is merely for a single product or 
project. A long term alliance is indicated for more than a single product or project, or for firms 
signing long term agreements. 
 
Capital investment/longevity  Long term  Short term  Unknown
18  Total 
No  54  213  26  293 
Yes  26  29  7  62 
Total  80  242  33  355 
 
Table 8 
Firms' distribution by capital investment and by alliance product (existing/ new) 
This table shows the distribution of firms in the sample by e innovation in the alliance product 
according to whether the alliance involved any type of capital investment. The alliance product is 
either (1) existing or (2) new. 
 
Capital investment/alliance 
product  New  Existing  Unknown
19  Total 
No  182  85  26  293 
Yes  21  34  7  62 
Total  203  119  33  355 
 
 
                                                  
18 Not mentioned in the announcement and/or cannot be inferred from it. 




Stock market reaction around announcement on strategic alliances 
 
The following table shows the abnormal return (AR) of the stock prices around announcement on 
strategic alliances. Panel A shows the results for the entire sample. Panel B shows the results for 
firms in alliances that do not involve any type of capital investment (shares or cash exchange). 
Panel C shows the results for firms in alliances that do include capital investment. The null 
hypothesis under the t-test is that the mean of AR=0, and under the sign test and sign-rank test - 
median of AR=0. 
 
    [-20, -5]  [-4, -2]  [-1, 1]  [2,4]  [5,20]  [-1, 20] 
Panel A –    AR (%) - mean  -0.67  -0.34  1.69  -0.09  -1.61  -0.02 
All firms  AR (%) - median  -0.92  -0.59  0.45  -0.01  -1.30  -0.94 
  t test p val  0.22  0.19  0.00  0.41  0.03  0.49 
  % of ARs>0  46.20  44.51  56.34  49.86  44.51  48.17 
  Sign test p val  0.07  0.02  0.01  0.46  0.02  0.23 
  Sign rank p val  0.26  0.06  0.00  0.78  0.05  0.98 
  N  355  355  355  355  355  355 
Panel B -                
No capital  AR (%) - mean  -0.67  -0.26  1.41  -0.11  -1.85  -0.55 
investment  AR (%) - median  -0.79  -0.69  0.37  -0.04  -1.59  -1.13 
  t test p val  0.25  0.27  0.00  0.40  0.03  0.32 
  % of ARs>0  46.76  44.37  54.95  49.15  42.66  48.12 
  Sign test p val  0.15  0.02  0.04  0.41  0.01  0.28 
  Sign rank p val  0.37  0.14  0.02  0.66  0.04  0.79 
  N  293  293  293  293  293  293 
               
Panel C -  AR (%) - mean  -0.66  -0.73  3.00  -0.01  -0.48  2.51 
Capital  AR (%) - median  -1.10  -0.24  1.14  0.33  0.84  -0.47 
investment  t test p val  0.36  0.19  0.00  0.49  0.40  0.13 
  % of ARs>0  43.55  45.16  62.90  53.23  53.23  48.39 
  Sign test p val  0.19  0.19  0.02  0.26  0.26  0.45 
  Sign rank p val  0.40  0.19  0.01  0.79  0.89  0.52 
  N  62  62  62  62  62  62 
               




Stock market reaction to announcement on strategic alliances and momentum 
 
The following table shows the abnormal return of the stock prices around announcement on 
strategic alliances when there is no exchange of shares, nor any capital investment. The sample is 
by the abnormal return during the period 20 to 5 days before the announcement.  Panel A shows 
the results for the group with the lowest abnormal return during days [-20, -5], Panel D, the group 
with the highest. 
 
    [-20, -5]  [-4, -2]  [-1, 1]  [2, 4]  [5, 20]  [-1, 20] 
Panel A -  AR (%) - mean  -20.26  0.33  1.29  -1.08  -4.09  -3.88 
Quarter 1  AR (%) - median  -17.49  0.08  -0.30  -2.49  -3.46  -1.94 
(lowest)  t test p val  0.00  0.38  0.11  0.15  0.05  0.09 
AR [-20,-5]  % of ARs>0  0.00  52.05  47.95  41.10  36.99  47.95 
  Sign test p val  0.00  0.41  0.41  0.05  0.01  0.41 
  Sign rank p val  0.00  0.49  0.68  0.03  0.05  0.22 
  N  73  73  73  73  73  73 
Panel B -                
Quarter 2  AR (%) - mean  -4.04  -0.53  1.76  0.44  -2.81  -0.61 
AR [-20,-5]  AR (%) - median  -3.82  -1.09  0.36  0.47  -2.29  -1.87 
  t test p val  0.01  0.24  0.01  0.28  0.05  0.38 
  % of ARs>0  0.00  43.24  55.41  54.05  37.84  43.24 
  Sign test p val  0.00  0.10  0.15  0.28  0.02  0.10 
  Sign rank p val  0.00  0.07  0.25  0.34  0.10  0.51 
  N  74  74  74  74  74  74 
Panel C -               
Quarter 3  AR (%) - mean  2.88  0.40  1.36  -0.56  -2.02  -1.23 
AR [-20,-5]  AR (%) - median  2.46  0.23  1.14  -0.01  -2.03  -0.85 
  t test p val  0.05  0.31  0.04  0.24  0.13  0.28 
  % of ARs>0  87.67  53.42  60.27  49.32  43.84  47.95 
  Sign test p val  0.00  0.24  0.05  0.50  0.17  0.41 
  Sign rank p val  0.00  0.71  0.04  0.67  0.17  0.85 
  N  73  73  73  73  73  73 
Panel D -               
Quarter 3  AR (%) - mean  18.77  -1.24  1.22  0.76  1.53  3.51 
(highest)  AR (%) - median  14.68  -1.79  0.71  0.36  1.05  2.59 
AR [-20,-5]  t test p val  0.00  0.07  0.07  0.18  0.21  0.06 
  % of ARs>0  100.00  28.77  56.16  52.05  52.05  53.42 
  Sign test p val  0.00  0.00  0.17  0.41  0.41  0.24 
  Sign rank p val  0.00  0.01  0.18  0.39  0.32  0.12 
  N  73  73  73  73  73  73 
               




Stock market reaction to announcement on strategic alliances sorted by the level of the 
response 
 
The following table shows the abnormal return of the stock prices around announcement on 
strategic alliances when there is no exchange of shares nor any capital investment. The sample is 
sorted according to the abnormal return during the period [-1, 1].  Panel A shows the results for 
the group with the lowest abnormal return during days [-1, 1], Panel D, the group with the 
highest. 
 
    [-20, -5]  [-4, -2]  [-1, 1]  [2, 4]  [5, 20]  [-1, 20] 
Panel A -  AR (%) - mean  -2.39  1.70  -6.28  -0.67  -2.74  -9.69 
Quarter 1  AR (%) - median  -1.83  0.08  -4.34  -0.36  -2.92  -10.05 
(lowest)  t test p val  0.13  0.03  0.00  0.23  0.10  0.00 
AR [-1, 1]  % of ARs>0  45.21  50.68  0.00  47.95  38.36  32.88 
  Sign test p val  0.24  0.41  0.00  0.41  0.03  0.00 
  Sign rank p val  0.00  0.09  0.19  0.36  0.84  0.41 
  N  73  73  73  73  73  73 
               
Panel B -  AR (%) - mean  -1.33  -0.71  -1.01  -0.56  -1.55  -3.13 
Quarter 2  AR (%) - median  -0.79  -0.89  -1.01  -0.19  -1.15  -2.31 
AR [-1, 1]  t test p val  0.24  0.19  0.10  0.24  0.20  0.07 
  % of ARs>0  43.84  38.36  19.18  47.95  42.47  39.73 
  Sign test p val  0.17  0.03  0.00  0.41  0.12  0.05 
  Sign rank p val  0.00  0.09  0.19  0.36  0.84  0.41 
  N  73  73  73  73  73  73 
               
Panel C -  AR (%) - mean  1.08  0.07  2.14  0.63  -1.40  1.37 
  AR (%) - median  0.59  -0.29  2.28  0.59  -0.72  0.74 
AR [-1, 1]  t test p val  0.26  0.46  0.00  0.19  0.20  0.24 
  % of ARs>0  52.70  47.30  100.00  52.70  45.95  50.00 
  Sign test p val  0.28  0.36  0.00  0.28  0.28  0.45 
  Sign rank p val  0.00  0.09  0.19  0.36  0.84  0.41 
  N  74  74  74  74  74  74 
               
Panel D -   AR (%) - mean  -0.08  -2.11  10.78  0.16  -1.72  9.21 
Quarter 3  AR (%) - median  -0.50  -1.80  8.86  -0.24  -1.35  8.27 
(highest)  t test p val  0.49  0.02  0.00  0.44  0.23  0.00 
AR [-1, 1]  % of ARs>0  45.21  41.10  100.00  47.95  43.84  69.86 
  Sign test p val  0.24  0.08  0.00  0.41  0.17  0.00 
  Sign rank p val  0.00  0.09  0.19  0.36  0.84  0.41 
  N  73  73  73  73  73  73 
               
 




Stock market reaction to announcement on strategic alliances – high-tech vs. low-tech 
 
The following table shows the abnormal return of the stock prices around announcement on 
strategic alliances when there is no exchange of shares, nor any capital investment. The 2-digit 
SIC for each firm is used to classify it as a high-tech firm or not.  Panel A shows the results for 
the high-tech firms and Panel B for the other firms (low-tech). 
 
    [-20, -5]  [-4, -2]  [-1, 1]  [2, 4]  [5, 20]  [-1, 20] 
Panel a -  AR (%) - mean  -0.74  -0.22  1.63  -0.26  -2.02  -0.66 
High-tech   AR (%) - median  -1.47  -0.63  0.45  -0.28  -1.25  -0.94 
  t test p val  0.27  0.34  0.00  0.31  0.05  0.32 
  % of ARs>0  46.01  45.07  53.99  48.83  42.72  47.89 
  Sign test p val  0.14  0.09  0.11  0.39  0.02  0.29 
  Sign rank p val  0.00  0.09  0.19  0.36  0.84  0.41 
  N  213  213  213  213  213  213 
               
Panel B -  AR (%) - mean  -0.50  -0.36  0.82  0.30  -1.39  -0.27 
Other  AR (%) - median  -0.05  -0.90  0.33  0.01  -2.73  -1.50 
(low-tech)  t test p val  0.38  0.31  0.13  0.34  0.20  0.45 
  % of ARs>0  48.75  42.50  57.50  50.00  42.50  48.75 
  Sign test p val  0.46  0.11  0.07  0.46  0.11  0.46 
  Sign rank p val  0.00  0.09  0.19  0.36  0.84  0.41 
  N  80  80  80  80  80  80 
 




Stock market reaction to announcement on strategic alliances – big vs. small firms 
 
The following table shows the abnormal return of the stock prices around announcement on 
strategic alliances when there is no exchange of shares, nor any capital investment. Panel A 
shows the results for the group with total assets greater than 128.98$ million (big firms) and 
Panel B for the rest (small firms). 
 
    [-20, -5]  [-4, -2]  [-1, 1]  [2, 4]  [5, 20]  [-1, 20] 
Panel A -  AR (%) – mean  -0.69  -0.62  0.68  0.17  0.44  1.29 
Big firms   AR (%) – median  -1.47  -0.73  0.33  0.15  -0.44  1.38 
  t test p val  0.25  0.08  0.06  0.35  0.33  0.14 
  % of ARs>0  43.15  41.10  56.16  52.74  47.95  51.37 
  Sign test p val  0.06  0.02  0.06  0.23  0.34  0.34 
  Sign rank p val  0.00  0.09  0.19  0.36  0.84  0.41 
  N  146  146  146  146  146  146 
               
Panel B -  AR (%) - mean  -0.66  0.09  2.13  -0.39  -4.13  -2.38 
Small firms  AR (%) - median  0.10  -0.40  0.50  -0.55  -3.50  -1.55 
  t test p val  0.35  0.45  0.00  0.30  0.01  0.12 
  % of ARs>0  50.34  47.62  53.74  45.58  37.41  44.90 
  Sign test p val  0.43  0.31  0.16  0.16  0.00  0.12 
  Sign rank p val  0.00  0.09  0.19  0.36  0.84  0.41 
  N  147  147  147  147  147  147 
 




Stock market reaction to announcement on strategic alliances – national vs. multinational 
alliances 
 
The following table shows the abnormal return of the stock prices around announcement on 
strategic alliances when there is no exchange of shares, nor any capital investment. Panel A 
shows the results for the group of firms in alliances where both firms are from the same country 
(national) and Panel B for the rest (multinational alliances).  
 
    [-20, -5]  [-4, -2]  [-1, 1]  [2, 4]  [5, 20]  [-1, 20] 
Panel A -  AR (%) - mean  -0.26  -0.09  1.40  0.19  -1.95  -0.36 
National  AR (%) - median  -0.32  -0.60  0.37  0.21  -1.39  -0.60 
  t test p val  0.41  0.43  0.00  0.34  0.04  0.39 
  % of ARs>0  48.09  43.83  55.32  53.19  43.40  48.94 
  Sign test p val  0.30  0.03  0.04  0.15  0.03  0.40 
  Sign rank p val  0.00  0.09  0.19  0.36  0.84  0.41 
  N  235  235  235  235  235  235 
               
Panel B -  AR (%) - mean  -0.57  -0.05  2.16  -1.86  -0.77  -0.47 
Multinational  AR (%) - median  -2.59  -1.60  0.93  -1.17  -1.80  -1.21 
  t test p val  0.44  0.49  0.08  0.11  0.41  0.46 
  % of ARs>0  42.42  48.48  54.55  30.30  39.39  48.48 
  Sign test p val  0.24  0.50  0.24  0.02  0.15  0.50 
  Sign rank p val  0.00  0.09  0.19  0.36  0.84  0.41 
  N  33  33  33  33  33  33 




Stock market reaction to announcement on strategic alliances – current market vs. market 
entry 
 
The following table shows the abnormal return of the stock prices around announcement on 
strategic alliances when there is no exchange of shares, nor any capital investment. Panel A is for 
the group of firms in alliances that deal with a current product of one of the companies (current 
market), and Panel B with firms in alliances dealing with entry to a new market by both 
companies (market entry). 
 
    [-20, -5]  [-4, -2]  [-1, 1]  [2, 4]  [5, 20]  [-1, 20] 
Panel A -  AR (%) - mean  -0.11  -0.77  1.76  0.31  -1.28  0.79 
Current  AR (%) - median  -0.01  -1.41  0.61  0.18  -0.86  2.16 
Market  t test p val  0.47  0.09  0.00  0.29  0.16  0.30 
  % of ARs>0  49.70  36.69  56.80  52.66  44.97  53.25 
  Sign test p val  0.50  0.00  0.03  0.22  0.11  0.18 
  Sign rank p val  0.00  0.09  0.19  0.36  0.84  0.41 
  N  169  169  169  169  169  169 
               
Panel B -  AR (%) - mean  -0.60  1.12  1.03  -0.70  -2.68  -2.34 
Market  AR (%) - median  -3.02  0.55  0.14  -0.46  -2.87  -2.24 
Entry  t test p val  0.37  0.07  0.09  0.18  0.06  0.13 
  % of ARs>0  43.88  58.16  52.04  46.94  39.80  41.84 
  Sign test p val  0.13  0.04  0.31  0.31  0.03  0.06 
  Sign rank p val  0.00  0.09  0.19  0.36  0.84  0.41 
  N  98  98  98  98  98  98 




Stock market reaction to announcement on strategic alliances – short-term vs. long-term 
alliance 
 
The following table shows the abnormal return of the stock prices around announcement on 
strategic alliances when there is no exchange of shares, nor any capital investment. Panel A is for 
firms in short-term alliances and Panel B for the rest (long-term) 
 
    [-20, -5]  [-4, -2]  [-1, 1]  [2, 4]  [5, 20]  [-1, 20] 
Panel A -  AR (%) - mean  0.55  -0.08  1.54  -0.03  -2.52  -1.02 
Short-term  AR (%) - median  -0.34  -0.74  0.61  0.07  -2.21  -0.85 
alliance  t test p val  0.33  0.44  0.00  0.48  0.02  0.24 
  % of ARs>0  47.89  43.19  56.81  51.17  41.31  48.36 
  Sign test p val  0.29  0.03  0.02  0.34  0.01  0.34 
  Sign rank p val  0.00  0.09  0.19  0.36  0.84  0.41 
  N  213  213  213  213  213  213 
               
Panel B -  AR (%) - mean  -3.58  -0.06  1.33  -0.17  1.08  2.24 
Long-term  AR (%) - median  -1.69  -0.13  -0.21  -0.39  0.65  2.27 
alliance  t test p val  0.04  0.47  0.07  0.42  0.30  0.17 
  % of ARs>0  46.30  50.00  48.15  48.15  50.00  51.85 
  Sign test p val  0.34  0.45  0.45  0.45  0.45  0.34 
  Sign rank p val  0.00  0.09  0.19  0.36  0.84  0.41 
  N  54  54  54  54  54  54 
 
 
 